Research
A photo from a conference
|
I work on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. My research mainly focuses on foundational issues in ancient metaphysics, including the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of essence--which I argue are distinct--and Aristotle's 'firmest' of all principles, the Principle of Non-contradiction. I am especially interested in metaphysical questions that intersect with other fields, including epistemology, philosophy of language, logic and ethics. I also have research interests in contemporary metaphysics, ancient ethics and the history of Aristotelianism.
You can find my CV here. |
Published and Forthcoming
|
"Higher-Order Predicates in Aristotle's Categories", Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming)[Preprint]
|
Abstract: In the Categories, Aristotle relies on the truth of claims like “Socrates is an individual” and “human is a species”, but it is not clear how terms like “species” and “differentia” fit into the framework of the Categories. Do these terms introduce substances or accidents? When we truly apply them to a subject, is the predication we express essential or accidental? These questions puzzled ancient commentators but have largely been neglected in modern scholarship. My central contention is that these terms correspond to "higher-order" entities outside of the categories. An upshot of my account is that sentences like “human is a species” and “Socrates is an individual” express neither essential nor accidental predications.
|
|
"Can You Deny the PNC? Metaphysics Γ.3, 1005b11-34”, w/ Ian Campbell, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (forthcoming) [Preprint]
|
Abstract: In Metaphysics Γ.3, Aristotle argues that it is impossible to deny the PNC. However, as several commentators—including Code, Barnes, Priest, Kirwan, and Dancy—have objected, Aristotle’s argument appears to rely on the invalid inference from 1 to 2 as follows:
|
|
Abstract: I offer a reconstruction of the said-of relation in Aristotle’s Categories. Commentators on the Categories disagree on foundational questions concerning the relation. According to one influential account—endorsed by Frede (1987), Gill (1984) and others--said-of is defined in terms of a more general notion of predication. On another influential account—proposed by Alan Code (1985 & 1986)--said-of is a primitive relation, in the sense that it cannot be defined, and the more general notion of predication is defined in terms of it. I argue that for Aristotle A is said-of B just in case A is part of the essence of B. On this account, said-of is definable but it is not defined in terms of predication.
|
In Progress
|
"Can you believe a contradiction?" w/Ian Campbell
|
Abstract: Aristotle claims that it is impossible to believe a contradiction—i.e. it is impossible to believe that p and not-p. His argument for this claim relies on the assumption that the belief that p and the belief that not-p are contrary mental states. Aristotle defends this assumption in De Interpretatione 14, but commentators find his defense to be "either hopelessly obscure or a rotten argument" (Dancy, 1975; cf. Ackrill, Barnes, Kirwan, Łukasiewicz). We argue that the defense is coherent and quite strong: if we grant Aristotle his views on truth, fundamentality, and change, then Aristotle's argument is successful.
|
|
Abstract: In Sophist 255e-257a, Plato resolves three apparent inconsistencies in his position. On the orthodox reading of the passage—endorsed in one form or another by Ackrill (1957), Vlastos (1970), Owen (1971), Brown (2008), Crivelli (2012), and others—Plato avoids inconsistency by giving an account of the meanings of the apparently inconsistent sentences. I argue that Plato’s strategy in these passages is thoroughly metaphysical: he shows that each of the problem sentences are true in a consistent state of affairs by specifying the set of facts that metaphysically explain that state of affairs.
|
|
"How to be a Normative X-Firster"
|
Abstract: What is it about goodness and obligation that makes them normative? According to the popular x-first theory, the normative properties and relation are normative in virtue of the fact that all and only these properties depend some basic normative property or relation. There is disagreement about what x is: some think that all the normative stuff depends on the reason relation, others champion value or fittingness, etc. I argue that all versions of the x-first view face a challenge: the x-firster cannot formulate their position in terms of any of the familiar dependence relations--supervenient, ontological dependence, grounding, real definition. I propose a dependence relation that works and draw out some consequences for the x-first program.
|
Dissertation: Essentialism in Late Plato and Aristotle's Categories
I completed my PhD in August, 2022. My dissertation, Essentialism in Late Plato and Aristotle's Categories, defended a reconstruction of the distinction between essential and non-essential features in Plato and in Aristotle. Its central contention is that Plato, in Sophist and Statesman, and Aristotle, in Categories, have fundamentally different ways of drawing the distinction between a thing’s essential features and its non-essential features. Plato distinguishes the essential features of a thing from its non-essential features by reference to the different roles they play in metaphysical explanations, whereas Aristotle draws the distinction by contrasting two relations between objects and their features.
